Volume 70

Issue 1

Article 9

December 1967

Constitutional Law--Administrative Searches
John Reed Homburg
West Virginia Univesity College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John R. Homburg, Constitutional Law--Administrative Searches, 70 W. Va. L. Rev. (1967).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol70/iss1/9

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Homburg: Constitutional Law--Administrative Searches

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

CASE COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Administrative Searches
D denied building inspector's entry into premises on three different occasions when the inspector did not produce a search
warrant. A criminal charge was brought against D for refusal
to admit the inspector. D instituted action for a writ of prohibition
alleging that the inspection ordinance under which he was being
prosecuted was unconstitutional. The Superior Court of California
denied the writ, the District Court of Appeals affirmed, and the
Supreme Court of California denied a petition for hearing. Held,
reversed. D had a constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment to insist on a search warrant; and, therefore, he could not be
convicted under the ordinance for refusal to consent to the inspection. Camarav. San Francisco,87 S.Ct. 1727 (1967).
The Supreme Court by a six to three vote has for the first time
held that a search warrant is required for an administrative search
when the occupant of a private dwelling refuses to admit an
inspector without such warrant.' In a companion case the Supreme
Court applied the same standard to administrative searches of
commercial property.'
The Fourth Amendment has historically been held to apply to
cases involving criminal activity.3 Now because refusal to permit
inspection is a criminal offense under most inspection ordinances,'
and because the occupant of the home is left subject to the discretion of the official conducting the inspection, the Court in the
principal case stated that administrative inspections also con'The Fourth Amendment is applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
2 See v. Seatle, 87 S.Ct. 1737 (1967).
3 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
4 Camara v. San Francisco, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730 (1967). The provision
under which the defendent was prosecuted is quoted as follows:
'Any person the owner or his authorized agent who violates, disobeys, omits, negiicts, or refuses to comply with or who resists or opposes
the execution of any of the provisions of this Code or any order of the
Superintendent, the Director of Public Works, or te Director of Public
Health made pursuant to this Code, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and
upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five
hundred dollars ($500.00), or by imprisonment, not exceeding six ()
months or by both such fine and imprisonment, unless otherwise provided
in this Code, and shall be deemed guilty of a separate offense tor every
day such violation, disobedience, omission, neglict or refusal shall continue.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1967

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 9
1967].

CASE COMMENTS

stitute a significant intrusion upon the interests to be protected by
the Fourth Amendment without the traditional safeguards it
guarantees.'
Applying the Fourth Amendment to administrative inspections
presents some new problems, the most important of which is the
standard of probable cause used in issuing search warrants. A
different standard of probable cause should be applied in administrative searches than is applied in criminal cases.6 The need
for inspection must be weighed in terms of reasonable goals of code
enforcement.7 There would be no need of probable cause to
believe that a particular dwelling contained matters in violation of
the code. Instead probable cause for inspection could be based on
the need to inspect a whole area. Code enforcement by area inspections is reasonable because it has judicial and public acceptance,
and public interest in eliminating dangerous conditions demands
area inspections. Inspections are only a limited invasion of privacy,
being neither personal nor necessarily producing evidence of crime.8
The probable cause test would depend on the nature of the search
with a mere passage of time being sufficient probable cause for
building inspections.9 Reasonableness is the ultimate standard. In
Justice White's words, "If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a
suitably restricted search warrant."'" In any event warrants would
be sought only after entry is refused unless a prior complaint has
been made."
Justice Clark, dissenting, declared that none of the problems
raised by the majority actually existed. He felt that the majority
ruling would make health inspections impossible in many places.
Reliance could no longer be placed on voluntary compliance of
home owners in permitting inspections and warrants issued would
be needless paper work.' 2
This case was not the first time the Supreme Court has had a
chance to consider the constitutionality of warrantless administrative
5

Id.
at 1733.
Id. at 1734.

61d.
7

8Id.at 1735.
9Id.
Old.

'
at 1736.
1"
2 Id.
1 1d. at 1741 (dissenting opinion).
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inspections. An opportunity to decide the issue was avoided eighteen years earlier. A conviction for the refusal to admit a health
inspector without a warrant was reversed by the Municipal Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia.'3 The case was appealed to
the Court of Appeals." In affirming the Municipal Court of Appeals decision, Judge Prettyman wrote a strong opinion holding
Fourth Amendment guarantees applicable to administrative inspections. He asserted that the basis of the prohibition against
searches was man's common law right to the privacy of his home
and not protection against self-incrimination.'" Judge Prettyman declared, "To say that a man suspected of a crime has a right to protection against search of his home without a warrant, but that a man
not suspected of crime has no such protection, is a fantastic
absurdity."' 6 Regardless of his motivation or authority, a governmental official in order to invade a private home must either face
an emergency that requires immediate action or be authorized to
do so by a magistrate.'" There is no distinction between a "search"
and an "inspection".'" Judge Prettyman believed that since health
laws are enforced by the police power, they should be subject to
the same constitutional limitations to which the other police powers
are subject.' 9 The dissenting judge in that case argued that the use
of warrants would lead to judicial supervision of health laws; and
that there was no type of warrant that authorized mere inspection
rights." On appeal to the Supreme Court the decision was affirmed but on different grounds thus avoiding the constitutional
issue of warrantless administrative inspections. 2'
The Supreme Court next had opportunity to decide the question
ten years later. In 1959, in Frank v. Maryland," by a narrow five to
four vote the Court rendered the decision that was to be overruled
in Camara. The Court upheld an arrest for refusal to permit an
administrative inspection without a warrant. Justice Frankfurter,
delivering the majority opinion, stressed the balancing of social interests which is basic to the decision in these cases. The right
Little v. District of Columbia, 62 A.2d 874 (D.C. Mun. App. 1948).
District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
"5Id. at 16.
16Id. at 17.
7
13
'1

1 1d.

18Id.

at 18.
19Id. at20.
20 Id. at 24 (dissenting opinion).
21 District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
22 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
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of the individual to be free from invasion of the privacy of his
home must be balanced against the welfare of society to be protected from the dangers of disease, fire, and unsafe construction.
Justice Frankfurter emphasized that the occupants had only a
peripheral interest to be protected in administrative inspections
and that the inspections placed little demand on the occupants. Also
no evidence for criminal prosecution was sought. 3 A long history
of acceptance and use favors administrative inspections. Justice
Frankfurter felt that the need for these inspections and the
difficulty in making them was very great and this consideration
outweighed the individual's interest in privacy."4 Moreover, the
requirement of a warrant for inspection would lead to the issuance of "synthetic search warrants" which would serve no useful
purpose and would give the home owner no added protection. 5
Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in Frank used many of
the arguments later relied on by the majority in Camara. In contrast
to Justice Frankfurter, Justice Douglas argued that historically
the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect the sanctity of the
home and was not concerned with criminal behavior. Besides,
administrative inspections could lead to eventual criminal prosecution for code violations."6 The holding in the Frank case was later
reasserted with a four to four decision in a similar case."
Extensive research discloses no West Virginia case on the issue
of warrantless administrative searches although the West Virginia
Constitution contains a section patterned after the Fourth Amendment.2" The West Virginia Code authorizes cities to conduct
inspections of private premises as long as not in violation of article
III section 6 of the West Virginia Constitution. 9 One West Virginia case indicates that this constitutional provision was modeled
after the federal amendment and should, therefore, "receive
harmonious construction when applied to the actions of state of23
24 Id. at
25 Id. at

367.

372.
d. at 373.
26
1d. at 378-379.
27 Ohio ex tel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960).
28 W. Va. Const. art. Inl, § 6, provides:
"The rights of the citizens to be secure in their houses, persons,
pa pers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated. No warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched,
or the person or thing to be seized."
29 W. VA. CODE ch. 8A, art. 4, § 13 (Michie 1966).
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ficers."3" It appears then that the West Virginia court would be in
harmony with the Camaraholding in interpreting the state constitution when appeal is made to the state constitutional right.
The Camara decision fits the pattern of recent Supreme Court
cases which have expanded individual rights. The effect of the
warrant requirement on administrative inspections is yet to be observed. That it would lead to wholesale refusals to admit inspectors
without warrants into homes is doubtful. Such refusals have been
few in the past and are not likely to increase as the inspections are
beneficial to the occupant and are generally accepted as useful.
The issuance of warrants under a different set of rules for probable
cause should not weaken the probable cause requirement as applied
in criminal cases. Competent magistrates should have no difficulty
distinguishing between the administrative and criminal cases and
applying the proper probable cause test. Camarahas underscored
and strengthened the citizen's right to be free from unreasonable or
arbitrary searches.
John Reed Homburg

Constitutional Law-Due Process in Juvenile Court Proceeding
Petitioner, a 15-year old boy, was committed to a state industrial school after he allegedly made a lewd telephone call to a
female neighbor. He was adjudicated delinquent in an unusually
informal juvenile court proceeding, with no sworn testimony, the
complainant not being present, and without notification to either the
petitioner or his parents of the right to be represented by counsel.
Gerald Gault was committed to the industrial school for the
period of his minority, unless sooner released, under code provisions
of the state of Arizona.' The boy's parents petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus in the county superior court, alleging that the
procedure used in the juvenile proceeding violated the petitioner's
constitutional rights. The county court dismissed the petition and
30

State v. Andrews, 91 W. Va. 720, 727, 114 S.E. 257, 260 (1922).

'Auz. REv. STATS. § 8-201-6 (1956). In contrast, an adult, convicted
in the criminal court for the same offense, would have been subject to a fine
of $5.00 to $50.00 or imprisonment in jail for not more than two months.

Asz. REv.

STATS.

§ 13-377 (1956).
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